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RECENT DECISIONS

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-ACTION TO REOVER EXCESSIVE

SUM PAID TO Dn CoRS IN SALE OF PROPERTY TO CORPORATION.The defendants, officers and directors of the plaintiff-corporation,
according to the complaint, conspired to defraud it. The complaint
further alleges that pursuant to such conspiracy in December of 1930
they agreed with the Irving Trust Company to purchase for eighty
thousand dollars a certain plant to be used by the plaintiff for processing silk, and six months later sold the plant to the plaintiff-corporation
at a personal gain of fifteen thousand dollars. This profit was
revealed by an entry in the journal of the corporation made in April,
1932, while defendants still controlled the corporation. In February,
1939 the present action was commenced in equity for an accounting
for the personal profits claimed to have been received by the defendants from the said transaction in violation of their fiduciary duty to
the plaintiff. The defendants moved to dismiis the complaint as
barred by the Statute of Limitations, for six years had elapsed since
the cause of action accrued.' The motion was denied, and the court
ruled under the authority of Potterv. Walker2 that the ten-year Stat3
ute of Limitations
applied, because this was an accounting for
"profits". 4 On appeal, held, order reversed, motion granted. The
complaint was barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations, since the
plaintiff had a complete and adequate remedy at law in an action for
money had and received, and the attempt to characterize the resulting
legal situation so as to bring the action within the ten-year Statute of
Limitations is not binding on the court. Jno. Dunlop's Sons, Inc. v.
Dunlop, et al., 259 App. Div. 233, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 818 (1st Dept.

1940).
Section 53 of the New York Civil Practice Act governs actions in
equity r such as an accounting for wrongful personal profits made by
officers or directors of a corporation in disregard of their position of
trust and confidence. 6 This section was applied to the first and seventh causes of action in Potter v. Walker, which consisted of an
accounting for secret profits received by several directors. 7 The situ-

IN. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr §48 (1).

2276 N. Y. 15, 11 N. E. (2d) 335 (1937).
3 N. Y. Civ. PmAc. AcT § 53.
4 172 Misc. 66, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 452 (1939).
5 Butler v. Johnson, 111 N. Y. 204, 18 N. E. 643 (1888) ; Pitcher v. Sutton,
238 App. Div. 291, 264 N. Y. Supp. 488 (4th Dept. 1933), aff'd, 264 N. Y. 638,
191 N. E. 603 (1934); Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair
Co., 270 N. Y. 86, 200 N. E. 589 (1936).
6 Asphalt Const. Co. v. Bouker, 150 App. Div. 691, 135 N. Y. Supp. 714
(lst Dept. 1912), aff'd, 210 N. Y. 643, 105 N. E. 1080, motion for rehearing or
or amendment of remittitur denied, 211 N. Y. 551, 105 N. E. 1080 (1914);
Potter v. Walker, 276 N. Y. 15, 11 N. E. (2d) 335 (1937); Goldstein v. TriContinental Corp., 282 N. Y. 21, 24 N. E. (2d) 728 (1939) ; Mencher v. Richards, 256 App. Div. 280, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 990 (2d Dept 1939), reargument
denied,
7 256 App. Div. 1003, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 557 (2d Dept. 1939).
It was alleged that certain directors of the Pan American Petroleum and
Transportation Company, pursuant to a conspiracy to acquire for themselves
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ation in the Potter case, however, is different from the present one,
for in the former case the directors employed corporate property and a
corporate transaction with another for their personal gain. In the
instant case it is alleged that the directors were the recipients of more
money than they deserved from the corporation, but this excessive
sum, though it might be termed a "profit" to the directors, does not
constitute a "profit' according to the definition used in stockholder's
actions. The claim is essentially for the return to the corporation of
a loss sustained by it, and the form of the pleading will not change
this fact." Furthermore, not all claims arising out of the wrongful
acts of officers or directors may be pursued in equity, for the cardinal
principle that equity will intervene only when there is no adequate
remedy at law also controls here. 9 Thus, in actions to recover from
delinquent directors for gifts to strangers, 10 payment of unauthorized
bonuses I and excessive salaries, and money procured by directors in2
selling stock to their corporation at a price above the market value 1
the six-year limitation, will apply, for the plaintiff can sue for money
had and received,13 and, such remedy being adequate, equitable relief
is unnecessary. Also, the six-year Statute of Limitations, as it read
prior to the enactment of the Laws of 1936,14 was held to govern
actions against directors for injury or loss to corporate property
through their negligence, since the affected party could resort to a
legal action for damages.' 5
and Blair & Co. a majority of the voting stock of Pan American, used the
money of the latter and derived secret profits. The directors were also charged
with having obtained wrongful profits through tlie purchase of Lago Oil Stock
by Pan American.
s Instant case.

9 Potter v. Walker, 276 N. Y. 15, 11 N. E. 335 (1937); Cwerdinski v.
Bent, 256 App. Div. 612, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 208 (1st Dept. 1939), aff'd, 281
N. Y. 782, 24 N. E. (2d) 475 (1939) ; Davis v. Cohn, 256 App. Div. 905, 9 N. Y.
S. (2d) 881 (Ist Dept. 1939) ; Mencher v. Richards, 256 App. Div. 280, 9 N. Y.
S. (2d) 990 (2d Dept. 1939).
20 Potter v. Walker, 276 N. Y. 15, 11 N. E. (2d) 335 (1937); Davis v.
Cohn, 256 App. Div. 905, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 881 (1st Dept. 1939).
11 Cwerdinski v. Bent, 256 App. Div. 612, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 208 (1st Dept.
1939), aff'd, 281 N. Y. 782, 24 N. E. (2d) 475 (1939); Davis v. Cohn, 256
App. Div. 905, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 881 (1st Dept. 1939).
12 Davis v. Cohn, 256 App. Div. 905, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 881 (1st Dept. 1939).
13 Mills v. Mills, 115 N. Y. 80, 21 N. E. 714 (1889); Middleton v. Twombly,
58 Super. Ct. 561, 9 N. Y. Supp. 924 (1890).
14 N. Y. Crv. Pa~c. Acr § 48 (3) ("An action to recover damages for an
injury to property, or a personal injury, except in a case where a different
period is expressly prescribed in this article." By L. 1936, c. 558, the words
"an injury to property, or" were struck out from said section and inserted in
N. Y. Civ. PRAC. Acr § 49 (6), the three-year Statute of Limitations, and
subd. 7 was added to § 49 of said Act. Subds. 6 and 7 apply to actions for
injury to property. The latter governs such actions generally, unless an action
comes within an express provision to the contrary, and the former when due to
negligence).
15 Potter v. Walker, 276 N. Y. 15, 11 N. E. (2d) 335 (1937) ; Chance v.
Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 256 App. Div. 840, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 478
(2d Dept. 1939); Mencher v. Richards, 256 App. Div. 280, 9 N. Y. S. (2d)
990 (2d Dept. 1939).
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In the instant case it was found that the wrong alleged to be done
to the complainant was no different from the wrong suffered by the
corporation in the gift, salary or bonus cases, and the court could not
"distinguish the sale of stock by directors at a price in excess of the
market value from the sale of a factory to a corporation under similar
conditions". However, it should be noted that the stock sale case,
being a decision of the same court, lacks the force it would have had
if it had been a Court of Appeals case to settle in New York the issue
raised in the present case.
A.G.

TAXATIoN-FEDERAL TAX ON INCOME FROM ALIMONY TRusTs.

-In July, 1930, respondent and his wife, residents of Connecticut,
entered into an agreement in contemplation of divorce. This provided
for the creation of an irrevocable trust by respondent; the income to
be used for the support of his wife and children or, if they should die,
for the heirs of his wife or as she provided in her will. After ten
years the stock was to be hers outright. The wife obtained a divorce
in Reno, in November, 1930. The decree approved the agreement;
accordingly, in December, 1930, the trust was created. The trustee
received the dividends for 1931, 1932 and 1933 and used them for the
wife, but upon respondent's failure to include them in his income tax
returns deficiencies were assessed against him. The action by the
Commissioner was sustained by the Board of Tax Appeals and reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Held, one judge dissenting,
affirmed. The Nevada law and the trust have given the husband pro
tanto a full discharge from his duty to support his divorced wife and
leave no continuing obligation on his part, hence the income to the
wife from the trust is not taxable to the husband, but it is to be treated
the same as income from property after a debtor has transferred that
property to his creditor in full satisfaction of his obligation. Helvern g v. Fuller,310 U. S. 69, 60 Sup. Ct. 784 (1940).
Alimony is a personal or family expense and as such is not
deductible in computing net income.' However, by statute,2 income
from an irrevocable trust is taxable to the beneficiary or, if so provided
in the trust agreement, to the trustee but never to the grantor. It has
been held by the Board of Tax Appeals that the grantor should not be
taxed on income from an irrevocable trust created for the support of
1 FEDERAL REvENUE Acr oF 1928, § 24 (a) (1) ("In computing net income
no deduction shall in any case be allowed in respect of personal, living or family
expenses."). TEAsuRY REG. 74, arts. 83, 281 (promulgated under the 1928 act
defines alimony as a personal or family expense).
2 REvExuE Acr oF 1928, §§ 166, 167. Cf. REVENuE Acr OF 1932.

